

# Democratizing G20 Governance: Performance and Possibilities

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## Introduction

How can the processes through which the world is governed be democratized, by strengthening the Group of Twenty (G20) system to this end? This question stands at the centre of global governance in many ways. The G20 systemically significant states sprung to life among finance ministers and central bankers in 1999 and leaders in 2008 to include, as equals at the centre of global governance, the rapidly emerging countries that contain many of the world’s poor. It took as its central mission not only providing financial stability in the wake of the global crises of 1997-98 and 2008-09 but also making globalization work for all, the bottom billion as well as the top one percent and those in the middle. Its swift success in restoring financial stability after the greatest global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s led its leaders at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 to proclaim that henceforth it would serve as the primary forum for their international economic co-operation. And since then the G20 has expanded in its agenda, its inclusion of international organizations and non-member countries in its summits, and its involvement of central components of civil society such as legislators, business, labour, young entrepreneurs, youth, think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In its central purpose, early performance and broadening participation, the G20 is becoming a more democratic centre of global governance, even as its closest peers — in the older Group of Eight (G8) and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — fall behind.

Yet more than a decade after its creation, the G20 still contains the same members, two of which are non-democracies. It still operates largely beyond the public’s view and facing resistance from those in the “G172” outside who prefer the universal hard law multilateral organizations of the Bretton Wood–United Nations system born in 1944-45 as the centre of global governance for the 21st-century world. That their claim comes more on the grounds of legitimacy than effectiveness makes it no less poignant, especially at a time when the economies of most G20 members are slowing, while the most rapidly growing economies in the world largely lie outside the G20. How then can those who believe in the potential of the G20 prove its effective performance, its growing democratic legitimacy and its possibilities for deepening democracy in the coming years?

This paper takes up this task in several, analytically systematic, evidence-based ways. First, it argues that the G20 was consciously created as a non-hegemonic, post-Westphalian form of international institution, based on its members' connectivity as well as capability, a concern with the equal vulnerability it bred for them and others, a desire to deepen democracy and a mission to make globalization work for the benefit of all. Second, it argues that the G20 is acquiring certain features of a proto-world government, notably in its ever expanding and more domestically intrusive agenda, its creation of decisions that are delivered through reliable compliance on the part of its members and the growing involvement of civil society with the G20 itself, rather than through the intermediation of members' sovereign Westphalian home states. Third, it argues that the G20 is slowly becoming the global decision-making centre the world needs and wants, as since 1999 and especially since 2008, it has become more democratic in its performance, through affirming democratic principles and acting to make globalization benefit more, and through its process by expanding participation for outside countries, international organizations and civil society groups. Fourth, it argues that recent developments, notably Russia's plans for the next G20 summit it will host in St. Petersburg on September 5-6, 2013, seem to represent a setback, but also offer possibilities for how the G20's growing democratic legitimacy and effectiveness can be enhanced.

## **The G20 as a Post-Westphalian International Institution**

The G20 was consciously created as a non-hegemonic, post-Westphalian form of international institution, based on its members' connectivity as well as capability, a concern with the equal vulnerability it bred for them and others, a desire to deepen democracy and a mission to make globalization work for the benefit of all.

The G20's closest predecessor as a global governance centre, the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Eight (G8) summit was highly similar in many ways (Lesage 2013). Yet in fundamental ways it is very different type of international institution and one well tailored for the intensely interconnected, globalized 21st-century world (Kirton 2013). The G8, authentic to its Westphalian roots, was a concert of major powers defined by relative capability, if with a new shared domestic level attribute of democratic polity added to the criteria for becoming a member of the club. In sharp contrast, membership in the G20 consciously required a country in the first instance to be "systemically significant," where relative capability was joined by relative connectivity as the key criteria. In some ways connectivity trumped relative capability, for G20 membership was based on the recognition of each member's equal vulnerability — each could be harmed as much as the other should the least capable but still highly connected member infect them all. Thus from its start in 1999 the G20 included countries that were both producers and consumers of financial security in the 1997-99 Asian-turned-global financial crisis. The logic continued, even if the countries in each category changed through to the American-turned-global financial crisis in 2008-10. The equality bred by intervulnerability is reflected in the fact that no one has suggested that even the most difficult member, Argentina, be expelled, in contrast to the fate of Greece in the hard law, Westphalian European Union.

This foundational element of the equality of vulnerability came with and led over time to equality in other features. The first was the initiative and conception that created the club, where it was not a financial secure neo-hegemonic America alone (if one scarred by the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management [LTCM] in the autumn of 1998), but also Canada, that had suffered collateral damage from the Mexican peso crisis in 1994. The second was the chairing and hosting, with Canada and Germany in 1999-2001 largely giving way to emerging country and non-members from 2002 (India) to 2008 (Brazil). This transition was replicated at the leaders' level, when the United States in November 2008 and September 2009, the United Kingdom in April 2009 and Canada in June 2010 were followed by Korea in November 2010, France in November 2011 and Mexico in June 2012. It also arose in the increasing ability of emerging members to set the agenda (such as development) and secure their preferred outcomes (the first stage and then the second stage of voice and vote reform of the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) (Schirm 2012). Nowhere were the G20's global centrality and internal equality more dramatically evident than in the autumn of 2001 when, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, the G20 was the only international financial institution able to meet to cope with this unifying, existential threat to all, with its weaker members such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Turkey required to instruct the G7 members how they could effectively cope with Islamic and thus terrorist finance.

In this new world of globalization, defined simply as the death of distance and delay, the Westphalian concept of fixed, static territoriality, grounded in geographic location, meant far less than it did in Europe in 1648. In the selection of G20 members, some attention was given as a secondary concern to geographic location. But that did not help the many excluded candidates — Thailand from Asia, Chile from the Americas and, in the end, Nigeria from Africa, as most lacked the requisite size and connectivity combined. Even at the summit level when the G20 began inviting guests, the list was led by Spain, not because the G20 did not adequately reflect the weight of continental Europe in the world but because Spain — as a sovereign and with Santander Bank — was deemed to be systemically significant, as became clear to many in 2012.

The G20 was born with two essential missions in 1999. The first was the global public good of ensuring financial stability. The most visible immediate beneficiaries were not those in the U.S., despite LTCM's collapse but those in turn in Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia and Brazil and, subsequently, in Turkey and Argentina too. The second mission also flowed directly from globalization, to ensure a deliberate redistribution and orientation toward equality at the level of the individual person — making globalization work for the benefit of all. The G8's foundational mission of defending and extending open democracy and individual liberty was less clearly a global public good, at least as the Cold War-afflicted global community perceived it back in 1975.

Yet the G20's creators inherited and applied the desire of the G8 to deepen democracy around the world. Of the 20 members, only two, China and Saudi Arabia, were non-democracies, with the latter admitted due to American insistence and because its petro-power mattered for global energy markets and thus also for the global economy. It soon proved to be systemically significant in regard to terrorist finance. The EU was admitted,

not due to a desire for more European voices but in order to compactly represent all of the EU's all democratic polities, as they were represented in the G8 and in recognition of the value that they added there (Larionova 2012). Indonesia was admitted due to its systemic significance but not allowed a seat until its post-Suharto democratic transition was assured, as it was by the time of the G20's first meeting in Berlin in December 1999. Nigeria was treated similarly, but did not move to democracy in time and was thus left out of the first meeting, as it has remained to this day.

## **The G20's Growing Performance as a Proto-Global Government**

Due to this character and composition, the G20 is acquiring certain features of a post-Westphalian proto-world government, notably in its ever expanding more domestically intrusive agenda, its creation of the decisions that are delivered by reliable compliance on the part of its members and by the growing involvement on civil society with the G20 itself rather than through the intermediation of the G20's sovereign Westphalian home states. In this way it meets the hard law standard of producing decisions with high degrees of precision, obligation and delegation and having these decisions bind the otherwise autonomous behaviour of its members acting in a structurally anarchic world (Abbott et al. 2000; Bayne 2004).

Yet it is becoming a proto-world government not in the Westphalian sense of stacked hierarchical authority with subordinate units surrendering sovereignty to superior in a zero sum game. Rather, it is doing so in the post-Westphalian, 21st-century form of serving as the club at the hub of a network of global governance, whose authority is based not on law or coercion but on voluntary consent arising from the global public goods that G20 governance effectively provides.

To be sure the G20 has from the start, and will for the foreseeable future, lack all the defining characteristics of the intergovernmental organizations based on their sovereign member states: notably a domestically entrenched legal charter and a bureaucracy or secretariat of its own (Weiss 2009; Payne 2005). Its governance and legitimacy do not derive from any supranational extension of a national state's legitimate monopoly of the use of force. Rather, the G20 is more legitimate than such hard law creatures at the national or international level for it depends entirely on the voluntary consent of its members and the citizens of their overwhelmingly democratic polities and their decision to focus their core political demands on it — among the many alternatives — and to look to it to provide core public goods. Only in this way does it acquire legitimacy in its mainstream sense of the "right to rule." But its deeper source of legitimacy lies in the more basic concept of legitimacy as "right rule." This refers to the component of inherent legitimacy — whether the institution created to do the right thing, as distinct from the components of input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy or output legitimacy that are the usual focus of analysts. Legitimacy can be measured, and is affirmed by several simple measures: all members wish to remain in the G20, many more wish to join, almost none has refused an invitation to come, and those participants that have been expelled have fought hard against this fate.

The particular performance of G20 summits as with other similar plurilateral summit institutions and multilateral organizations can be assessed according to the six dimensions of governance that such institutions provide (Kirton 2012) (see Appendix A). Such a systematic, evidence-based assessment contradicts the dominant narrative that the performance of the G20 summit has been declining since its strong start in its initial, crisis fuelled years of 2008-09 (Angeloni 2011).

### **Domestic Political Management**

The first dimension is domestic political management — the way the leaders use their summit presence and performance for managing their politics and policy back home. It is measured initially by the actual attendance a leader at the summit. The G20 started strong with full attendance at Washington, London and Pittsburgh but slipped in 2010 at Toronto when the leaders of Brazil and Australia stayed at home. However, it then bounced back with almost full attendance at its last three summits in Seoul, Cannes and Los Cabos.

Another measure is the compliments given to a member in the summit's collective communiqué. On these communiqué compliments, the G20's performance started slow but since 2010 became much stronger in both the overall number of compliments to its members and in the number of members it has complimented.

### **Deliberation**

The second dimension of performance is deliberation, both privately among the leaders and publicly as reported in their collective summit communiqués. Their performance in private deliberation can be measured roughly by the length of time the leaders spend together. Here, while all G20 summits have been very short encounters spanning two days, there has been a slight increase in their time together at the last two summits in Cannes and Los Cabos.

The summits' public deliberative performance can be measured by the number of documents the leaders collectively issue. Here performance rose to a peak at Toronto, but has since had a slow slide back to where it was at the start in 2008. Measured more specifically by the number of words in these communiqués, the G20 got off to a slow start but has sustained a surge since Pittsburgh.

### **Direction Setting**

The third dimension, the key to legitimacy, is the affirmation or invention of principles and norms, especially those that have a great global appeal. In its affirmation of the principles of democracy and human rights, the G20 started slowly at Washington and London but then showed a strong sustained surge to a new peak of 34 affirmations at Los Cabos. As G20 hosts, the new democracies of Mexico and Seoul care as much or even more about democracy and human rights than did the old democracies of the G8 when they served as G20 hosts. The G20 is converging on the principles of democracy and human rights, even with the presence of China and Saudi Arabia in the group.

### **Decision Making**

The fourth dimension is decision making — producing collective commitments with precision and obligation designed to bind the members. As measured by the number of commitments produced at each summit, there was a substantial start at the first four summits but then a surge at the last three. Cannes in 2011 produced almost three times as many commitments as the first summit in Washington did in 2008.

### **Delivery**

The fifth and perhaps the most important dimension is the delivery of the decisions, or the compliance of the members with the summit commitments their leaders make. Decisions made mean little if they do not actually bind the members to adjust their behaviour to implement them after the summit is held. Here the available evidence, produced by the joint assessments of Moscow's Higher School of Economics and the University of Toronto, show that the G20 had a strong start at its first two summits, slipped at next two but has subsequently risen to reach a new peak of 77% for Cannes in 2011. Additional special studies conducted at the University of Toronto confirm these results.

### **Development of Global Governance**

The sixth dimension is developing global governance in its institutional or architectural form, both within and outside the G20 system. Here there has been a general, if not steady, rise since Toronto in 2010 in the references contained in the summit communiqués. The G20 has increased its attention to its own institutional improvement. A sign of the G20's effort to serve as the centre of global governance is the fact that the number of outside international institutions it has referenced has doubled, from 11 at Washington to 22 at Los Cabos.

Taken together these six dimensions show that the dominant pattern is that of an overall increase in performance from the first to the seventh summit, although not an increase that has come in a steady way.

### **The G20's Growing Democratic Governance**

Third, the G20 is slowly becoming the global decision-making centre the world needs and wants, as since 1999 and especially since 2008. It has become more democratic in its performance, through affirming democratic principles and acting to make globalization benefit more, and in its process by expanding participation for outside countries, international organizations and civil society groups.

The G20 summit has strongly affirmed the globally appealing values of open democracy and individual liberty and human rights (see Appendix B). It has also moved well to meet the core missions that it was created, crafted and continued to fulfill, since it was invented as a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999.

On the first mission of financial stability, its strong initial summit success on addressing the financial crisis and strengthening financial regulation enabled it to move on to other priorities once the crisis that catalyzed its creation has receded. It thus took up with greater strength its second core mission of making globalization work for all, the G20 summit has also shown some success.

Its deliberation on development has generally risen to the Seoul Summit in November 2010 (see Appendix C). Here the subject commanded a majority of the communiqué, as the summit produced the new Seoul Development Consensus to guide its work in the years ahead. Moreover, an initial assessment of the compliance of the members with the 22 development commitments suggests that Seoul was a success in delivery, as well as decision making and deliberation in this domain.

A more specific focus on the summits' communiqué treatment of the now central global issue of economic inequality further suggests rising performance (see Appendix D). At the first summit, economic inequality received only two references, one to employment and the other to the poorest countries. At London in 2009 attention exploded, with eight passages referring to the poorest countries or people, two to the most vulnerable, two to social protection or support, and one to employment. Moreover, the principle of fairness was affirmed twice. A few months later, at Pittsburgh in 2009, there was an expanded emphasis on these subjects, with unemployment, discrimination and social exclusion added to the list and the general principle of fairness replaced by the specific one that “the benefits of economic growth are broadly and equitably shared” (G20 2009).

To be sure, on specific aspects of equality, such as youth employment and health there have been shortcomings (Kirton and Kulik 2012). But on key aspects, such as gender and women, the evidence suggests that the most recent Los Cabos Summit marked a new peak in the attention accorded by the G20 (Kulik 2012).

It is also appropriate to go beyond deliberation and direction setting, and the other dimensions of performance to ask how effective G20 governance has been in generating the intended and desired results in the real world. To do so convincingly involves making powerful assumptions about the role of governments, intergovernmental institutions and the G20 in particular in generating targeted change in the real economic, social and political world, among all the other causally relevant forces at work.

Without specifying such a complex causal model, it can simply be observed that since G20 summit governance began, there has been no crisis or deep deterioration of global financial stability, akin to that from 1997-99 and 2007-08. Within the G20 members, not a single bank of financial institution of systemic relevance — of the same sort as Lehman Brothers or AIG — has gone bust since 2008. Some observers may wish to give credit to the work of the Financial Stability Board, but that body was a creation of the G20 summit and been guided by it since its start.

In the case of globalization that works for the benefit of all, there are widely varying levels of citizens' inequality in income, wealth and employment across the countries of

the G20. Moreover, inequality has been growing long before G20 summit governance began, both in cases such as the U.S., where inequality has been expanding since the 1970s, and Brazil, where it has been decreasing since the start of the Lula years. More research is required before the G20 summit can be declared a success or a failure in ensuring that economic benefits are more equally shared among the citizens in its members or in the world beyond. What can be said with confidence at this stage is that there is much more the G20 summit can do, in its actions and in its institutionalization, to improve economic inequality, in accordance with the defining purpose that it has.

The G20 summit has also democratized its process through inclusiveness, but inviting ever more international organizations (beyond the IMF and World Bank members) to participate, and doing so also for non-member countries, with five invited country guests becoming the recent norm (Payne 2010). It has further developed its mechanisms for civil society participation, starting at Toronto with the creation of the Business 20 (B20), the Young Entrepreneurs Summit (YES), the Girls 20 and the Parliamentarians 20. The Labour 20 (L20) was added at Cannes. Mexico added a Think Tank 20 (T20) for Los Cabos as well as a forum for NGOs. While G20 leaders agreed at Seoul to work with the academic community, no Academic 20 has yet been formed.

## **Prospects and Possibilities for Democratic Deepening at St. Petersburg**

Recent developments, notably Russia's plans for the next G20 summit it will host at St. Petersburg on September 5-6, 2013, seem to represent a setback, but also offer possibilities for how the G20's growing democratic legitimacy and effectiveness can be enhanced.

### **Plans and Prospects for St. Petersburg**

As of October 2012, the G20 was still operating under the Mexican presidency. Russia, which would become president in December 2012, is in the process of finalizing its priorities for its year as host in 2013, focused on the St. Petersburg Summit in September.

From Russia's perspective, the G20 is still a very young entity, which is shaping its mission and its agenda. The G20 appeared at the time of the 2008 crisis in order to serve as a crisis management and crisis prevention body. The first summit in Washington in November 2008 discussed the crisis, established institutions and made reforms that would prevent a repetition of the crisis. Then the G20 agenda broadened and deepened. Development, green growth and energy, and corruption were added.

Russia believes that the issues that have arisen on the agenda have made the G20 not only an economic but also a political entity. In Russia's view, the G20 mission should remain to serve an important economic forum of the largest economies in the world. Policy coordination among the members should be established in order to promote more equal growth, more stable growth and cooperation in different economic matters. The Russian presidency would do its best to strengthen the G20 in this capacity. Its goal is also to have the G20 act as a results-oriented forum. Russia asks what the specific results can be



achieved in 2013 for the years to come. The opportunity and challenge for the G20 are that it includes a diverse set of countries with different levels of development, different goals and different views on the economy. Cooperation among this set of countries offers an opportunity to provide a new impulse to global growth and global economic development. However, the diversity among members could be challenging and counterproductive, as it might lead to lengthy dialogue and discussions without a consensus. Therefore, Russia and the G20 need to think through the possible mechanisms of bridging together these separate interests and finding solutions, that is, how best to bring together interests rather than allow them to diverge over time.

Russia believes its greatest contribution to G20 summitry has been bridging differences between its G8 partners on the one hand and its BRICS partners on the other, and especially the U.S. and China, on key issues such as the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, specific formulations on protectionism and monetary policies.

Russia's aims in planning its summit are to organize a successful G20, to respond to the global economic and political agenda, and to produce results. To do so, it set several priorities, embracing both the inherited built-in agenda and new issues it would add. Its agenda consists of growth, employment and investment at the core; financial regulation, especially for emerging and developing countries; reform of international financial institutions; trade beyond the Doha Development Agenda; development, very importantly; corruption; and energy as the new presidency priority. Its conception of the summit process is to invite outsiders, including Chile for a second time, to dispense with most ministerial forums but add a meeting of energy ministers, to use the troika of the outgoing, current and incoming presidencies more meaningfully, to delay the creation of a secretariat and to end the L20 and T20 while reducing the role of the B20 and YES, and giving the Civil Twenty (C20) pride of place.

### **Possibilities for Democratic Reform**

In some ways these plans represent a setback for the ongoing process of process of democratizing G20 governance. But at this early stage there are several reforms that can be made to strengthen the G20's democratizing thrust. One is to put inequality for the first time at the centre of the G20's agenda, as the C20 is preparing to do, with encouragement from the Russian government. A second is to restore the meeting of employment ministers and the L20, to advance the employment inequality agenda. A third is to admit a now democratic Nigeria as a systemically significant state, led by its energy resources that will be a central subject at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2013, but only if it moves seriously to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law and complies with the fossil fuel subsidy phase-out commitment the G20 leaders made in September 2009. A fourth is to have parliamentarians meet before the summit and assume accountability tasks. The fifth, and most important, is to have the G20 leaders meet more often and for a longer time.

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## Appendix A: G20 Summit Performance

Julia Kulik, October 1, 2012

	Attend- ance	Domestic Political Management (compliments)		Deliberation			Direction Setting			Decision Making	Delivery	Development of Global Governance			
		#	% of members	# days	# doc- uments	# words	Demo- cracy	Lib- erty	Total	# commit- ments	Com- pliance	Internal		External	
												# ref	Spread	# ref	Spread
2008 Washington	100%	0	0%	2	2	3,567	10	2	12	95	0.53	0	0	40	11
2009 London	100%	1	5%	2	3	6,155	9	0	9	88	0.42	12	4	116	27
2009 Pittsburgh	100%	0	0%	2	2	9,257	28	1	29	128	0.28	47	4	117	26
2010 Toronto	90%	7	15%	2	5	11,078	11	1	12	61	0.28	71	4	171	27
2010 Seoul	95%	3	15%	2	5	15,776	18	4	22	153	0.50	99	4	237	31
2011 Cannes	95%	11	35%	2	3	14,107	22	0	22	282	0.54	59	4	251	29
2012 Los Cabos	95%	6	15%	2	2	12,682	31	3	34	180	N/A	65	4	143	22
Total	N/A	28	N/A	14	22	72,622	129	11	140	987	N/A	353	28	1075	173
Average	96.42 %	4	12.14%	2.00	3.14	10,375	18.43	1.57	20	141	0.43	50.43	4	153.57	24.71

Notes:

N/A=Not Applicable. Ref = references.

a. Domestic Political Management: 100% attendance includes all G20 members and at least one representative from the European Union, excludes those invited on a year-to-year basis. Number of compliments includes all explicit references by name to the full members of the Summit that specifically express the gratitude of the institution to that member. The % of members complimented indicates how many of the 20 full members received compliments within the official documents.

b. Direction Setting: includes the number of statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty

c. Decision Making: indicated the number of commitments as identified from all official documents by members of the G20 Research Group in coordination with representatives from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

d. Delivery: Compliance scores are measured on a scale from -1 to +1, -1 indicating no compliance and +1 indicating full compliance. A commitment is fully complied with if a Summit member succeeds in achieving the specific goal set out in the commitment.

e. Development of Global Governance: the number of internal references includes the number of references made to G20 institutions within the official documents and the spread indicates how many different internal institutions were mentioned. The number of external references includes the number of references made to institutions outside the G20 and the spread indicates how many different institutions were mentioned.

## Appendix B: Direction Setting: Democratic Values

Julia Kulik, September 28, 2012

Summit	Democracy	Individual Liberty	Total
2008 Washington	10	2	12
2009 London	9	0	9
2009 Pittsburgh	28	1	29
2010 Toronto	11	1	12
2010 Seoul	18	4	22
2011 Cannes	22	0	22
2012 Los Cabos	31	3	34

### 2008 Washington

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	2	Gender Equality	0
Transparent	5	Rule of Law	2
Good Governance	1	Human Rights	0
Accountability	1		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	1		
Surveillance/Monitoring	0		

### 2009 London

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	1	Gender Equality	0
Transparent	2	Rule of Law	0
Good Governance	1		
Accountability	2		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	0		
Surveillance/Monitoring	3		

### 2009 Pittsburgh

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	3	Gender Equality	0
Transparent	14	Rule of Law	1
Good Governance	0	Human Rights	0
Accountability	2		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	1		
Surveillance/Monitoring	8		

**2010 Toronto**

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	1	Gender Equality	0
Transparent	8	Rule of Law	1
Good Governance	0	Human Rights	0
Accountability	2		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	0		
Surveillance/Monitoring	0		

**2010 Seoul**

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	0	Gender Equality	1
Transparent	18	Rule of Law	1
Good Governance	0	Human Rights	2
Accountability	0		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	0		
Surveillance/Monitoring	0		

**2011 Cannes**

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	0	Labour Rights	0
Open	0	Gender Equality	0
Transparent	22	Rule of Law	0
Good Governance	0	Human Rights	0
Accountability	0		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	0		
Surveillance/Monitoring	0		

**2012 Los Cabos**

Reference	# of References	Reference	# of References
Fair	1	Labour Rights	1
Open	2	Gender Equality	1
Transparent	18	Rule of Law	1
Good Governance	0	Human Rights	0
Accountability	10		
Info/Knowledge Exchange	0		
Surveillance/Monitoring	0		

## Appendix C: G20 Leaders Conclusions on Development

Zaria Shaw and Sarah Jane Vassallo

Year	# of Words	% of Total Words	# of Paragraphs	% of Total Paragraphs	# of Documents	% of Total Documents	# of Dedicated Documents
2008 Washgton	651	17.8	9	12.6	1	100	0
2009 London	1726	27.6	28	30.4	3	100	1
2009 Pittsburgh	2292	24.5	20	18.3	1	100	0
2010 Toronto	3899	34.5	61	42.3	2	100	1
2010 Seoul	9195	58.1	105	47.9	5	100	2
2011 Cannes	2545	17.9	33	16.9	3	100	0
2012 Los Cabos	4021	31.3	49	33.3	2	100	0
Average	3475.6	30.2	43.6	28.8	2.4	100	0.6

**Notes:**

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

“# of Words” is the number of development-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

“% of Total Words” refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year specified.

“# of Paragraphs” is the number of paragraphs containing references to development for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

“% of Total Paragraphs” refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.

“# of Documents” is the number of documents that contain development subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

“% of Total Documents” refers to the total number of documents for the year specified.

“# of Dedicated Documents” is the number of documents for the year that contain a development-related subject in the title.

The G20 recognizes that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development, and for this reason it is important to respect the development of country-owned strategies. With regard to the diversity of growth models and approaches, following the G8, the G20 is committed to strengthening the dialogue on varying development philosophies, strategies and policies from which all countries can benefit. The G20 has called upon developing countries to establish sound economic and social policies to attract more private capital flows, and for developed countries to support these actions through improved and more effective lending (through the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral development banks), an open trading system and increased development assistance. The G20 is committed to a shared vision for global development and continues to develop a global partnership among developed and developing countries.

Inclusions African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union (AU), debt relief, development aid, development assistance, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), developing countries, development financing, development gap, donor, emerging economies, European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), global rebalancing, highly/heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), international development assistance, International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), international financial institutions (IFIs), International Monetary Fund (IMF), least developed countries (LDCs), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), multilateral development banks (MDBs), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), North-South relations, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), official development assistance (ODA), Paris Club, poorest of the poor, poverty reduction, sustainable development, World Bank, United Nations (UN)

#### Coding Rules

The unit of analysis is the paragraph/sentence.

A direct reference to development or a cognate term is required.

Cognate or extended terms can be used without a direct reference to development if they have previously been directly associated together in summit communiqué history.

## Appendix D: G20 Summit Equality Affirmations, by number of references

Julia Kulik and John Kirton, October 14, 2012

Subject	2008 Washington	2009 London	2009 Pittsburgh	2010 Toronto	2010 Seoul	2011 Cannes	2012 Los Cabos
<b>Principle</b>							
Fair(ness)	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Broadly Shared	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Equitably Shared	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Social Equity	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Equal Partners	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Gender Equality	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Equal(ity)	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Total Affirmations	0	2	2	0	3	1	1
Total Affirmed	0	0	2	0	3	1	1
<b>Problem</b>							
(Un)Employment	1	2	12	10	6	11	18
Discrimination	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Social Exclusion	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Youth Unemployment	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Total Affirmations	1	2	14	10	6	13	18
Total Problems Affirmed	1	1	3	1	1	2	1
<b>Group:</b>							
Poorest	1	9	13	8	6	3	3
Most Vulnerable	-	2	2	5	3	6	2
Most at Risk	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Total Affirmations	1	11	17	13	9	9	6
Total Affirmed	1	2	4	2	2	2	3
<b>Policy</b>							
Social Protection	-	2	2	2	2	4	2
Social Support	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Social Safety Net (Support)	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
Employment Insurance	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total Affirmations	0	3	3	2	2	5	3
Total Policies Affirmed	0	2	2	1	1	2	2