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Russia's War against Ukraine: G7 and G20 Responses
Peter Hajnal
January 25, 2023
Presentation on "What Is the Role of the G20?" at Senior College, University of Toronto, Faculty Club, January 25, 2023
Russia's attack against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has caused tragic suffering to the Ukrainian people. Beyond that, Russia's actions have challenged the entire rules-based post–World War II international system, including trade, climate action, global health, military, economic and political alignments and the functioning of formal and informal international institutions. The war has had a major impact on global energy and food security. Millions of Ukrainians fled or have been internally displaced, creating an enormous refugee crisis.
I would like to discuss two issues today: First, how and why do G7 and G20 positions on the crisis differ? And secondly, can the G7 and the G20 address the Ukraine situation and also respond to other crucial challenges?
The UN Security Council met on February 25, 2022,, the day after the Russian invasion for an urgent discussion of the situation. A draft resolution, calling for an end to the hostilities, was supported by 11 members but was vetoed by permanent member Russia, so it did not pass (see Table 1). G20 members China and India abstained. Ironically, the meeting was presided over by Russia, Council president for the month of February.
Two days later (on February 27), the Council met again and passed a resolution allowing the General Assembly to convene an emergency special session. This was a procedural resolution, not subject to veto, and it passed by a majority of the Council's 15 members; only Russia voted against. China and India abstained, and the rest voted in favour, so the special session of the Assembly could proceed.
On September 30 Russia vetoed another Security Council resolution condemning the annexation following the staged referenda in occupied territories. Ten of the 15 members (including Mexico, a G20 member) supported the resolution, while G20 members Brazil, China and India were among the four abstainers.
The emergency special session of the General Assembly met on February 27 and was followed by a series of meetings throughout 2022. The resulting resolutions have been characterized by condemnation of Russia, often reiterated, but each subsequent meeting added more substance to the discussion and decisions. I'll summarize these briefly.
On March 2 the Assembly condemned the Russian attack and called for an end of hostilities. Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 passed with a substantial majority of 141 votes in favour, out of the total UN membership of 193 countries. All G7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US) voted for it, but the response from some other G20 countries was different: Russia (not unexpectedly) voted against it, along with non-G20 members Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea and Syria. G20 members China, India and South Africa were among the 35 abstainers (see Table 2).
On March 24 the Assembly placed blame on Russia for the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and demanded that Russia comply with international humanitarian laws. The resolution was approved by 140 countries voting in favour. Once again, Russia, along with Syria, North Korea, Eritrea and Belarus, voted against, and G20 members China, India and South Africa were among the 38 countries abstaining. A competing resolution tabled by South Africa made no mention of Russia in connection with the humanitarian crisis, but referred to the humanitarian situation as "emanating out of" the conflict. It did not gain enough support for submission to the General Assembly.
On April 7, resolution A/RES/ES-11/3 was passed by 93 votes (including all G7 countries); 24 (including China and Russia) voted against and 58 (including G20 members Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) abstained. That resolution suspended Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council in response to Russia's "violations and abuses of human rights and … of international humanitarian law."
On October 12 the Assembly called on all countries not to recognize Russia's annexations and demanded the immediate reversal of that illegal action. 143 countries voted in favour; five against (Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria); and 35 abstentions (including G20 members China, India and South Africa).
As the year 2022 drew to an end, the General Assembly on 14 November 2022 voted on a resolution called on Russia to pay war reparations to Ukraine. Ninety-four countries voted in favour (including Argentina and Australia), 14 (including Russia and China) against, and 73 (including Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) abstained. The resolution recognizes that Russia must be held accountable for its aggression and recommends the creation of a registry of damages.
The Russian aggression led to frequent contacts and extra meetings of G7 leaders, some virtual, some in person. Several of these conversations and special summits have been wholly or partly devoted to the Russia-Ukraine war, and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy was invited to participate in most of these meetings.
The G7 held a special summit on the day of the invasion, February 24, where the leaders "condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms the Russian invasion of Ukraine", expressed support to Ukraine, called on Russia "to immediately de-escalate and … withdraw its forces from Ukraine", and announced "severe and coordinated economic and financial sanctions." They also condemned the involvement of Belarus.
Another special G7 summit convened in Brussels on March 24. The leaders reaffirmed their resolve to impose severe economic and financial measures on Russia. They warned against Russia's threat to use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and denounced Russia's disinformation campaign against Ukraine, and promised steps to reduce reliance on Russian energy.
On April 7 the G7 raised the cost of Russia's aggression by a seven-point undertaking:
The regular annual summit of the G7 was hosted by Germany on 26-28 June in Elmau. It built on the momentum of the preceding special summits and conversations, and represented a substantial scaling-up of G7 and broader measures concerning Ukraine. It presented a 12-point plan, promising "to support … Ukraine" financially, militarily, diplomatically and with humanitarian aid "for as long as it takes," and demanding accountability for war crimes.
On October 11, G7 leaders condemned the missile attacks against civilian infrastructure and cities, rejected Russia's illegal annexation of Ukraine's occupied territories including Crimea and stated that they "will never recognise this illegal annexation or the sham referenda that Russia use[d] to justify [these measures]." They pointed out that Russia has blatantly violated the principles of the UN Charter, and promised to address the negative impact of Russia's aggression for global economic stability, including energy security and affordability.
Finally, on December 12 the G7 leaders reaffirmed its "unwavering support" for Ukraine "for as long as it takes" and condemned Russia's attacks targeting critical infrastructure. They committed to intensify economic sanctions and undertook to establish a multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform to help Ukraine's post-war recovery and reconstruction.
G7 countries have unanimously condemned Russia's aggression, imposed severe sanctions, and offered significant and increasing military, economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
Germany and Japan have changed their long-standing foreign, energy and security policies radically as a result of Russia's actions. Germany has reduced its heavy dependence on Russian energy and invested in alternative sources. Germany decided to increase its military budget (although it still falls short of NATO's goal of 2% of gross domestic product that member countries are expected to spend on defence). The government has been sending more and more arms to Ukraine, although it is still hesitant about sending its Leopard battle tanks.
Japan, in a radical break with the country's post–World War II stance is now more favourable to strengthening its self-defense forces. This is reportedly supported by the majority of the Japanese public.
The positions of G20 countries that are not G7 members range from condemnation of Russia and imposition of punitive sanctions to neutrality, and support for Russia. Australia and South Korea are aligned with the G7 and the EU on both sanctions and offering significant military and other assistance to Ukraine.
Table 3 summarizes these positions. I should add that these positions are more subtle than a simple table can illustrate, and the domestic context figures in each country's policies. I recall Putnam's theory that all countries are playing a two-level game, acting both on the international scene and within their particular domestic context.
China favours the territorial integrity of states. It needs stability for its expanding trade and other global ties. On the other hand, Xi Jinping needs to maintain its ties with Russia and has been reluctant to punish Putin for the aggression. China has not condemned the Russian invasion and has criticized western sanctions. Its trade with Russia increased significantly since Russia launched its invasion. But China has not supported Russia militarily. Both China and India have picked up a fair amount of Russian energy exports curtailed by western sanctions, and this has contributed substantial revenues to Russia.
India has not condemned Russia, but it has regretted the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine and expressed its hope for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Historically, India has followed a non-aligned policy since its independence but has had long-lasting and friendly ties with Russia.
Saudi Arabia has not opposed Russia's war on Ukraine. It worsened the global energy situation when OPEC teamed up with Russia on oil production and pricing.
Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey fall into this category. I will just cite two examples: Turkey and South Africa.
Turkey, a NATO member, voted to condemn Russia in the UN but has claimed neutrality. But Turkey, jointly with the UN, negotiated the Black Sea Grain Initiative, freeing Ukrainian grain exports and easing the global food crisis. And in his September 20 speech to the UN General Assembly, Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed the need to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, expressed concern over the price increases for food and energy resulting from the conflict, and deplored the situation around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. He called for a diplomatic solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and offered a Turkish mediating role.
South Africa has good relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and favours a negotiated solution to the conflict. Historically, South Africa has had strong ties to Russia (and the Soviet Union before that). The Soviet Union supported the ANC in its anti-apartheid struggle.
The G20's lack of unanimity on Russia and Ukraine became evident at the July 15-16 meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors. The Chair's Summary noted: "Many members agreed that the recovery of the global economy has slowed and is facing a major setback as a result of Russia's war against Ukraine, which was strongly condemned, and called for an end to the war" – many, but not all, members.
Suggestions have been made to exclude Russia from the G20. The idea may be supported by some non-G7 G20 members but is unlikely to find consensus. US president Joe Biden called for inviting Ukraine as a guest country to the Bali Summit. Such invitations are within the purview of the leader holding the year's presidency of the G20. The Indonesians did invite President Zelenskiy to the summit. The host government stated that the G20 "Presidency [has] an obligation to invite all G20 members to attend the meetings and have effective discussions to find solutions … [and that m]embers also supported the adaptation of the existing agenda to enable the G20 to address the economic impact of the war while also maintaining a commitment to address pre-existing global challenges and lead the world back to strong, sustainable, inclusive and balanced growth." (G20 Finance Ministers)
The G20 Bali Summit was a test for host country Indonesia and for the G20 as a whole. Tension among leaders due to the Ukraine war was inevitable. Before the summit, various scenarios had been discussed, including a boycott by G7 members of the G20 plus other like-minded G20 members. In the event, there was no boycott, and, to general relief, Putin decided not to go. The G20 Bali Leaders' Declaration (2022) stated that "most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy – constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks," but noted that "there were other views and different assessments of the situation and sanctions." In careful language, it went on to say: "Recognizing that the G20 is not the forum to resolve security issues, we acknowledge that security issues can have significant consequences for the global economy."
Yulius Purwadi Hermawan (2022) noted the overlap between the German G7 agenda and Indonesian G20 priorities. The Elmau Summit's centrepieces were sustainable planet, economic stability and transformation, global health, food and energy security, and development. Indonesian priorities were global health, digital transformation, energy transition, and crises resulting from the pandemic and climate change, and to the UN 2030 Agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals. But Hermawan recognized that the Russia-Ukraine war has eroded G20 collaboration: "While G7 members tend to be unified in responding to the war, G20 members have been sharply divided, particularly in response to the question of Russia's participation in G20 meetings."
What are the causes of the divergent G7 and G20 approaches to the Ukraine crisis? The answer begins with the fact that the main cohesive factor of the G7 is that it holds common values of human rights, democracy and a rule-based international system. The 2022 G7 summit host, German chancellor Olaf Scholz, stated that, following Russia's attack on Ukraine, a "broad global alliance for peace and the rule of law … had come closer together than ever before". By contrast, the G20 coheres around shared interests rather than shared values.
The G7 and the G20 have both been able to keep to their agenda while also responding to crises. Common challenges of global health, development, climate change, trade, food security and other issues continue to be of shared interest to the two Gs and require joint action. This played out at the G20 Bali Summit, which focused on the threefold agenda of global health architecture, digital transformation and sustainable energy transition. Nevertheless, the Russia-Ukraine war was front and centre, and, significantly, made its way explicitly into the communiqué. In the G7, sustainability and economic stability, were high on the German summit agenda last year. The G7 has always built on linkages between issues: the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on global health, refugees, food security, trade, environment and climate enabled the leaders to connect their regular agenda to the overwhelming Ukraine crisis.
G20 (G7 members in bold) |
February 25, 2022 |
February 27, 2022 |
September 30, 2022 |
Argentina |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Australia |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Brazil |
Yes |
Yes |
Abstain |
Canada |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
China |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
France |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Germany |
N/A |
N/A |
Yes |
India |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Indonesia |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Italy |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Japan |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Mexico |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Russia |
No (veto) |
No |
No (veto) |
Saudi Arabia |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
South Africa |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
South Korea |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
Turkey |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
United Kingdom |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
United States |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
European Union |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
G20 (G7 members in bold) |
March 2, 2022 |
March 24, 2022 |
April 7, 2022 |
October 12, 2022 |
November 14, 2022 |
Argentina |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Australia |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Brazil |
Yes |
Yes |
Abstain |
Yes |
Abstain |
Canada |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
China |
Abstain |
Abstain |
No |
Abstain |
No |
France |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Germany |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
India |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Indonesia |
Yes |
Yes |
Abstain |
Yes |
Abstain |
Italy |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Japan |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Mexico |
Yes |
Yes |
Abstain |
Yes |
Yes |
Russia |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Saudi Arabia |
Yes |
Yes |
Abstain |
Yes |
Abstain |
South Africa |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
Abstain |
South Korea |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Turkey |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
United Kingdom |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
United States |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
European Union |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
G20 (G7 members in bold) |
Opposing Russia |
Supporting Russia |
Neutral |
Argentina |
|
|
X |
Australia |
X |
|
|
Brazil |
|
|
X |
Canada |
X |
|
|
China |
|
X |
|
France |
X |
|
|
Germany |
X |
|
|
India |
|
X |
|
Indonesia |
|
|
X |
Italy |
X |
|
|
Japan |
X |
|
|
Mexico |
|
|
X |
Russia |
|
X |
|
Saudi Arabia |
|
X |
|
South Africa |
|
|
X |
South Korea |
X |
|
|
Turkey |
|
|
X |
United Kingdom |
X |
|
|
United States |
X |
|
|
European Union (except Hungary) |
X |
|
|
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